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Noam Chomsky’s 1959 review of B. F. Skinner’s
Verbal Behavior is widely acknowledged as
having sounded the death knell of behaviorist
approaches to human learning and knowledge,
and as paving the way for the ‘cognitive
revolution’ in the decades to follow. Over fifty
years later, Chomsky’s remarks are not merely
of historical significance, as they are still relevant
to the contours that an enquiry into human
cognition and behavior must have.
At its most basic level, Chomsky’s critique of
behaviorism claims that children’s first
language(s) acquisition is directed by the stimuli
provided by adults through a reinforcement of
casual observation and imitation by children.
What Chomsky is suggesting in this early article
is that much of the child’s linguistic knowledge
is expressed in contexts where no reinforcement
is ever available. As research has progressed
in the area, a more complete picture of the
inaccuracy of the behaviorists’ fable has
emerged. Parents neither reinforce children’s
grammatical utterances, nor pay any special
attention to their grammatical wellformedness;
and children also resist any attempts at
correction. Furthermore, while children may well
imitate the linguistic utterances of adults, such
imitation does not form the basis of the linguistic
knowledge they put to use. The following two
sets of dialogues—which form part of research
conducted after Chomsky’s review—
demonstrate this:
A) Adult: Where is that big piece of paper I
gave you yesterday?
Child: Remember? I writed on it.
Adult: Oh, that’s right, don’t you have any
paper down here, buddy?
B) Child: Want other one spoon, Daddy
Adult: You mean, you want the other spoon.
Child: Yes, I want other one spoon, please
Daddy.
Adult: Can you say “the other spoon”?
Child: Other … one … spoon
Adult: Say “other”.
Child: other
Adult: “spoon”
Child: spoon
Adult: “other … spoon”
Child: other … spoon. Now give me other
one spoon.
(Pinker, 1995, p. 281)
The first set of dialogues (A) show that the
reinforcement that a child gets, through parental
agreement in this case, is for an ungrammatical
utterance. Simply put, parents care more about
the meaning and truth of their children’s linguistic
acts, than about their grammatical form. The
exchange in (B) illustrates that while imitation
is something that a child may easily do, neither
does she/he see the injunction to imitation as a
reinforcement behavior by the adult, nor does
she/he let the imitated utterance form the basis
of her own utterances.
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Add to this the fact that the nature of reinforcing
behavior may itself be full of ‘noise’, as verbal
communication is full of false starts, stops,
incomplete utterances, etc. If a child were to
rely on this flawed input as the basis for learning
language, the speed with which she/he acquires
the basic grammar of her/his language would
be unexpected. Across languages, a normally
developing child has a complete grasp of its rules
of sentence formation (syntax) by the time she
is five. Beyond that age, even as children (and
the adult) continue to learn new words and
phrases, very little syntax learning needs to take
place; in fact, by the beginning of the teens, very
little syntax learning can take place. An oft-
mentioned example in this context is that of a
child named Genie, who was rescued from an
abusive father at the age of thirteen. Genie had
been kept in an outhouse, chained to a potty
since the age of one, and while food was pushed
into the shed twice a day, she had never been
spoken to by anyone. After her rescue, Genie
made rapid strides in cognitive development, but
her overall linguistic skills remained poor, and
she could never produce grammatical utterances
of even average length.
It is also rare for a child to hear ungrammatical
sentences as part of the stimulus. However, if a
child’s knowledge of ‘ungrammaticality’ is also
the product of reinforcement, how is this
knowledge ever arrived at? This is especially
relevant when we consider the number of
mistakes that children do not make. A simple
example is that of a phrase order in a sentence,
which in a language such as English is of the
order of Agent-Action-Recipient-Object-
Location. As Roger Brown observed in the
1970s, while the earliest utterances of children
in the age group 2-2.6 years conform to this
basic order, and the difference between their
output and that of an adult lies mainly in the fact
that children’s outputs have more omissions.
These omissions can be due to a variety of
factors, some acquisition-related factors and
others extra-grammatical. An example of the
latter is that children often allow the discourse
context to do the talking as it were, so if an
object can be pointed to, they do not linguistically
represent it. For example, sentence (f) below
could be accompanied by a pointing gesture to
the object that is to be laid on the floor. A case
of grammatically-conditioned omission could
however be made out for the systematic
omission of prepositions in the entire set of
examples – clearly the realization of prepositions
as markers of spatial relations cannot be
produced at this early stage of acquisition.
(C) Agent  Action  Recipient Object  Location 
   (Mother  gave   John   lunch   in the kitchen.) 
 
a. Mommy   fix. 
b. Mommy       pumpkin. 
c. Baby         table. 
d.   Give    doggie. 
e.   Put     light. 
f.   Put       floor. 
g. I    ride      horsie. 
h. Tractor  go       floor. 
i.   Give    doggie   paper. 
j.   Put     truck    window. 
k. Adam    put     it    box. 
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In the examples above it will be noticed that
while the early utterances of children do not
uniformly realize the full frame of Agent-Action-
Recipient-Object-Location (as shown in the
adult sentence Mother gave John lunch in the
kitchen), they do have knowledge of the frame.
If they did not, then children should have been
equally likely to produce Mommy fix as well as
fix Mommy to mean ‘Mommy fixed it’; however,
they do not. Similarly, if this frame were not
available, we would expect that the children
would have used example (f) to describe an
event when the floor was being laid in a building
(i.e., when the floor was interpreted as the
Object), but that was never the case – (f) was
used when something was to be laid on the floor
(i.e., the floor was location).
Children also do not make certain mistakes that
they would be expected to make were they
generalizing from observed patterns. As Pinker
(1994) points out, if British/American English-
speaking children were generalizing from
observed patterns, we would expect that on
observing the patterns in (D), they would utter
the ungrammatical (Eii). However, British/
American English-speaking children never make
this mistake.
(D) (i)  Irv drove the car into the garage.
(ii) Irv drove the car.
(E) (i) Irv put the car into the garage.
(ii) *Irv put the car.
Since the 1970s, this line of reasoning has come
to be known as the ‘poverty of the stimulus’
argument: Given that the data children receive
from the input is woefully underdetermined to
serve as the basis for language acquisition, and
given that children nevertheless do acquire the
grammar(s) of their native language(s), it must
be that the child’s learning of language is guided
by some form of innate linguistic capacity. The
existence of a critical period—a window of time
in which environmental exposure stimulates an
innate trait—for language acquisition suggests
that this innate endowment is genetic, “spurred
on by the unfolding of the genome during
maturation” (Pinker, 1995)
Finally, if grammar is what this innate
endowment must be, then this human cognitive
ability is an instance of domain-specific
intelligence, unrelated to the development of
general intelligence and cognitive abilities.
Research, both preceding and following
Chomsky’s (1959) Review has confirmed this
in a number of ways. The human brain has
circuitry in the left hemisphere exclusively for
language, and there are a few inherited
syndromes that target language alone. One such
syndrome is Specific Language Impairment
(SLI), which recent research has established
as genetic. SLI is a purely linguistic inherited
disorder caused by mutation in the gene FOXP2.
Moreover, intact language has been found to
coexist with severe retardation, as in the famous
case of Christopher, who was born with
hydrocephalic brain damage, and was severely
retarded, but had unique and prodigious language
abilities—he could read, write and communicate
in any of fifteen to twenty languages (Smith and
Tsimpli, 1995).
For language teachers of young children today,
Chomsky’s nativist ideas point towards a
profound question—how much of the innate
endowment is implicated in the construction of
linguistic knowledge? Chomsky’s answer would
be much along the same lines as his observations
in the Creation and Culture Conference in
Barcelona in November 1992:
Most problems of teaching are not problems of
growth but helping cultivate growth. … Typically,
they come in interested, and the process of
education is a way of driving that defect out of
their minds. But if children[’s] [...] normal
interest is maintained or even aroused, they can
do all kinds of things in ways we don’t
understand.
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It is therefore important to question whether the
methodology we employ assumes that first or
second language learning is primarily graphic,
and that the process is deductive, requires rote
memorization, role playing and structure drilling,
and stress habit formation as a means of
learning language. These are all behaviourist
assumptions. Teaching first or second languages
through grammar is not really teaching language
at all, because what is taught is a system of
prescriptive rules that linguists/grammarians
have come up with to describe a language.  To
tell students that they must not split an infinitive
with an adverb is to teach an aesthetic choice—
i.e. the ‘correct’ form is not I want to quickly
tell you but I want to tell you quickly—because
all native speakers of English actually agree that
both alternatives are grammatical. Teaching
young students the grammatical jargon for the
form ‘I am reading” is the present progressive,
is not teaching language, but grammar, and while
an appreciation of grammatical analysis is an
important aspect of learning, this is a
sophisticated skill and not suitable for very young
children. At the heart of our teaching must lie
the understanding that children already know
their first language, and that this knowledge can
be harnessed to acquiring other languages as
well. Finally, while the focus on writing is crucial,
it must not be at the cost of encouraging children
to fully ‘activate’ their developing knowledge
of language, by learning new vocabulary (the
only aspect of language acquisition that carries
on throughout one’s lifetime) and using all the
syntactic constructions they have an innate
competence in.
Awareness of the innateness argument should
also enable us to critically evaluate the
instruments by which we teach language—
textbooks, storybooks, readers, etc. While one
can be misled into thinking that a particular lesson
‘teaches’ some aspect of language, quite often
the lesson’s content simply piggybacks on the
child’s tacit knowledge of language. For
example, no textbook would ever attempt to
explain the linguistic properties of the Hindi use
of apne-aap, or the English themselves.  In fact
many crucial properties of language are not the
subject matter of lessons at all. Consider
Chomsky’s (1983) example of the kind of
sophisticated knowledge that children must have
to be able to process their parent’s utterances
(even before they can themselves produce
similar ones):
Take the sentence “John believes he is
intelligent.” Okay, we all know that “he” can
refer either to John or to someone else; so the
sentence is ambiguous. It can mean either
that John thinks he, John, is intelligent, or
that someone else is intelligent. In contrast,
consider the sentence “John believes him to be
intelligent.” Here, the pronoun “him” can’t refer
to John; it can refer only to someone else.
Now, did anyone teach us this peculiarity about
English pronouns when we were children? It
would be hard to even imagine a training
procedure that would convey such information
to a person. Nevertheless, everybody knows it
– knows it without experience, without training,
and at quite an early age.
The ‘Chomskyan revolution’ has had an
important impact on language teaching
methodologies, particularly in the development
of content-based communicative approaches.
These approaches make active learner
participation the centrepiece of the activity, and
aim at providing appropriate language input and
increasing communicative competence.
However, there are still many other fruits that
remain to be picked. One of them is the
implication that the Chomskyan revolution has
for mother tongue education and multilingual
learning.
Although we have not mentioned it thus far, the
Chomskyan perspective argues that the innate
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mechanism enables children to acquire as many
languages as there are in the input provided a
child’s environment. So, if a child has parents
that speak to her in two languages, say
Malayalam and Bangla, and her playmates and
other caregivers speak to her in Hindi, she will
acquire at least three languages in her childhood.
By the time she is five, she will be roughly equally
competent in all three (provided, of course, that
the input is regular and use of all three languages
is not discouraged). It has been observed that
once children start going to school, this incipient
multilingualism gets eroded, and some of the
languages get restricted to the home domain,
often withering away. However, imagine a
school in which the languages of all children
were encouraged, where homework involved
learning poetry in more than just one or two
dominant languages, and where these other
languages were brought to the classroom and
shared. In that world, children’s cognitive
development and linguistic creativity would
develop more rapidly, and they would be more
aware of differences and the rights of others.
In such a scenario, even though education may
ultimately move in the direction of one or two
languages, the richness of the initial multilingual
resource would ease the transition.
In the world we live in, however, many, if not
most, children are often educated in a language
that they have never heard as the input. While
this language could be English, it could also be a
major regional language not spoken in their home
environment. This imposes a tremendous
cognitive burden on the child who is expected
to gain ‘knowledge’ through a medium that she/
he does not comprehend. This creates a
fundamental inequity between her/him and other
children who do have access to the language of
education, an inequity that cannot serve as the
edifice on which true learning can be built.
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